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Orientation:  Past  research  recognises  that  human  resources  management  practices  may 
influence innovative behaviour, particularly as compensation systems can be used as a tool to 
increase intrapreneurial activity.
Research purpose: The aim of this study is to determine the relationship between actual versus 
desired compensation practices and elevated intrapreneurial behaviour. This is in line with 
research that focuses on how to promote business innovation, rather than merely research 
whether innovation is desirable for businesses or not.
Motivation  for  the  study:  Recognising  that  entrepreneurial  actions  are  the  bedrock  of 
intrapreneurial behaviour and that these behaviours may be critical to the long-term vitality 
of a firm and economy, it is important to facilitate the empirical study of them in an under-
researched,  emerging  market  environment.  Moreover,  compensation  such  as  reward 
preferences and variable pay schemes remain controversial in terms of their costs versus 
contributions, and these constructs deserve more empirical research.
Research approach, design and method: The study employed a quantitative research design, 
using a cross-sectional and empirical approach with primary data sources. A structured web-
based instrument rendered a sample of 209 respondents from a diverse set of businesses. 
Canonical correlational analysis was carried out to test the hypotheses. 
Main findings: The results reveal that a gap exists between an employee’s perception of 
desired compensation practices and the actual compensation practices. The results further 
highlight that non-outcome-based measures like pay risk, job risk and expectations of success 
play a role in determining whether employees decide to be intrapreneurial or not. 
Practical/managerial implications: Due to the potential impact rewards have on intrapreneurial 
behaviour, it is necessary to design relevant compensation systems as part of organisational 
architecture in order to foster intrapreneurship. 
Contribution:  In  response  to  calls  to  unveil  innovation  practices  in  developing  countries 
and  in  acknowledging  a  contingency  relationship  between  compensation  practices  and 
intrapreneurship, this article is one of the first studies to test the relationship between actual 
versus desired compensation practices and elevated intrapreneurial behaviour in an emerging 
market context.
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Introduction
Innovation is often invoked as a strategy for corporate renewal: researchers describe how human 
resource management (HRM) interventions are used as change levers to support a shift in business 
strategies (Jimenez-Jimenez & Sans-Valle 2008). Innovation and entrepreneurship in corporations 
have been labelled in many different ways, including intrapreneurship, with conceptual roots in 
innovation entrepreneurship (Schumpeter 1934), and innovation management (Covin & Miles 
2007). 
Past research finds that encouraging risk-taking and innovative behaviours must be consistent 
with individualised performance assessment and compensation (Berber et al. 2012; Ellis, Henry 
& Shockley 2010) particularly as HRM practices can affect intrapreneurship in varied ways. 
Attitudes towards opportunity exploitation and innovative behaviour are significant only when 
individuals perceive both positive subjective norms and being in high control (De Jong 2013). 
Management support and compensation practices promote commitment to innovate on the part 
of employees (Grandori, Giordani & Hayton 2011). Moreover, compensation practices can either 
be used as a tool to increase innovative activity or they can discourage innovative activity by 
rewarding other behaviours.Original Research
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Research purpose 
By  recognising  the  importance  of  compensation  practices 
and  reward  preferences  (Snelgar,  Renard  &  Venter  2013) 
that  promote  intrapreneurship,  this  study  investigates  the 
relationship  between  actual  versus  desired  compensation 
practices  and  elevated  intrapreneurial  behaviour.  This 
is  in  line  with  research  that  focuses  on  how  to  promote 
intrapreneurship,  rather  than  merely  research  whether 
innovation is desirable for businesses or not (Kenworthy & 
McMullan  2013).  The  overall  question  this  study  seeks  to 
address  is  which  compensation  practices  are  significantly 
associated  with  intrapreneurial  behaviour.  The  study 
contributes  to  existing  literature  and  extends  current 
knowledge on the relationship between compensation and 
intrapreneurship  by  examining  the  degree  of  uncertainty 
and risk as moderators of intrapreneurial behaviour (Hayton 
2005;  Urban  2008).  Drawing  on  the  resource-based  view, 
expectancy theory and agency theory, various hypotheses 
are formulated in which the moderating role of risk control 
is  factored  into  the  compensation  and  intrapreneurship 
equation.  By  assembling  a  sample  of  more  than  200 
respondents from a wide range of organisations in a diverse 
set of industries, this article provides preliminary evidence of 
differences in compensation practices in an under-researched 
geographical  emerging  market  area:  Johannesburg,  South 
Africa.
Importance of research 
Innovation  and  intrapreneurship  have  been  emphasised 
as  key-drivers  for  emerging  economy  firms  to  revitalise, 
reconfigure resources and transform into market-orientated 
firms that are ready to compete in the global economy (Yiu 
& Lau 2008). Recent research demonstrates the importance of 
how ‘catching up countries’ benefit from innovations in the 
medium and low technology sectors (Rotaba & Beaudry 2012). 
Thus far, there has not been much work on intrapreneurship 
in transition economies and emerging markets, as contrasted 
with entrepreneurship studies at the individual level. 
Recognising  that  entrepreneurial  actions  are  the  bedrock 
of entrepreneurial processes and behaviour, and that these 
behaviours may be critical to the long-term vitality of a firm 
and  economy  (Stevenson  1983;  Urban  &  Barreria  2010),  it 
is important to facilitate the empirical study of them in an 
under researched, emerging market environment. Moreover, 
compensation such as reward preferences and variable pay 
schemes remain controversial in terms of their costs versus 
contributions, and these constructs deserve more empirical 
research (Moore & Bussin 2012; Ncube, Bussin & De Swardt 
2013).
In response to the call to unveil innovation and technology 
management practices in developing countries (Cetindamar 
&  Pretorius  2012),  and  in  acknowledging  a  contingency 
relationship  between  compensation  practices  and 
intrapreneurship, this article is one of the first studies to test 
the relationship between actual versus desired compensation 
practices  and  elevated  intrapreneurial  behaviour  in  an 
emerging market context.
Brief theoretical overview
Intrapreneurship and innovation
In most HRM practices, the basic principle is that practices 
differing  in  kind  are  complementary  in  sustaining 
innovation, in particular those infusing powerful individual 
incentives  co-applied  with  practices  infusing  team  spirit 
and  organisational  identification  (Grandori  et  al.  2011). 
Consequently, if top management believes that enhancing 
employees’ innovative behaviour will contribute to fulfilling 
the  organisation’s  goals,  a  compensation  system  must  be 
designed and supported that will promote entrepreneurship 
practices (Lerner, Azulay & Tishler 2009).
There  are  various  ways  to  classify  innovations  (Miller  & 
Miller 2012); one way to revive innovativeness and create 
a dynamic dominant logic is to make intrapreneurship the 
basis upon which the organisation is conceptualised (Morris, 
Kuratko & Covin 2008; Sharma & Chrisman 1999). Innovation 
is  a  multidimensional  phenomenon  and  the  development 
of an innovation is frequently modelled as a process. Thus, 
the process of the development of innovation needs to be 
managed diligently in order to increase performance. If firms 
devote substantial resources to the innovation process, but 
are unable to turn them into innovative offerings, resources 
are  squandered  and  firm  performance  suffers.  Moreover, 
innovation  has  to  address  market  needs,  and  requires 
entrepreneurship if it is to achieve commercial success (Morris 
et al. 2008). Entrepreneurship and innovation are positively 
related to each other and interact to help an organisation 
to flourish. Likewise, intrapreneurship and innovation are 
complementary,  and  a  combination  of  the  two  is  vital  to 
organisational success and sustainability in today’s dynamic 
and changing environment. Additionally, entrepreneurship 
and innovation are not confined to the initial stages of a new 
venture; rather, they are dynamic and holistic processes in 
intrapreneurial  and  innovative  organisations  affecting  the 
development of entrepreneurial and innovation behaviour in 
an organisation (Antoncic & Hisrich 2001; Urban 2008). For the 
purpose of this study, the term intrapreneurship is used since 
longstanding literature has conceptualised intrapreneurship 
as  a  multidimensional  phenomenon  that  incorporates  the 
behaviour and interactions of the individual, organisational, 
and environmental elements within organisations (Antoncic 
& Hisrich 2001; Covin & Miles 2007).
Compensation practices
The literature on intrapreneurship suggests that compensation 
practices  are  one  of  the  vital  structural  dimensions 
promoting  innovation  and  intrapreneurship  (Hayton 
2005). Due to the impact rewards have on intrapreneurial 
behaviour, they are part of the organisational environment 
for fostering intrapreneurship and increasing performance 
by  intrapreneurs  (Hornsby  et  al.  2009).  Additionally, 
compensation  systems  require  a  person-organisation 
Page 2 of 10Original Research
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fit  where  a  needs-supplies  approach  that  assesses  the 
match  between  individual  preferences  and  pay  needs  is 
recommended. This fit is important when considering that 
key aspects of human capital are vital to explaining search-
based discovery and innovative behaviour (Marvel 2013).
Previous  research  has  found  that  preferred  compensation 
practices related to both the internal venture’s performance 
and individual performance (outcome-based compensation 
practices) are best aligned with intrapreneurship initiatives 
(Lerner et al. 2009). Consistent with agency theory, outcome-
based  compensation  practices  align  the  preferences  of 
agents and principals because the rewards for both parties 
depend on the same actions. In contrast, other researchers 
(Monsen,  Patzelt  &  Saxton  2009)  report  that  getting 
employees to participate in corporate venturing is not just 
a matter of financial utility maximisation, but that the other 
non-outcome-based  measures  like  pay  risk,  job  risk  and 
expectations of success play an important role in determining 
employee  participation.  This  means  that  contingent 
compensation is important in most high-performance work 
systems and includes aspects of gain sharing, profit sharing, 
stock ownership, pay for skill or various forms of individual 
or team incentives (Lerner et al. 2009; Wood & De Menezes 
2011). 
Resource-based theory and compensation
The  resource-based  theory  postulates  that  organisations 
are  heterogeneous  in  terms  of  the  resources  they  control; 
these resources include all the assets, capabilities, attributes 
and  knowledge  an  organisation  possesses  (Barney  1991). 
Even  though  resource  heterogeneity  is  the  most  basic 
condition  of  resource-based  theory,  it  is  not  enough  for 
sustainable  advantage.  For  instance,  if  an  organisation 
has heterogeneous assets that can be easily imitated, such 
assets will only generate a short-term advantage (Alvarez & 
Busenitz 2001). On the other hand, organisations that have 
the capability to innovate can be expected to generate greater 
profits than those that are non-innovators. At the same time 
it seems logical that employees should be compensated more 
as their innovative efforts increase; as productivity from such 
innovative efforts increases, there should also be a matching 
increase in their compensation (Barney 1991). 
Expectancy theory and compensation
The  importance  of  preferred  compensation  practices  for 
enhancing  desired  employees’  behaviour  can  also  be 
examined through the lens of the expectancy theory. This 
means  that  employees  act  in  ways  that  they  believe  will 
result in rewards of some importance to them, such as higher 
earnings  (Lerner  et  al.  2009).  Such  an  expectancy  premise 
suggests  that  managers  can  positively  influence  their 
employees  by  making  pay  contingent  upon  performance; 
this  means  that  compensation  practices  should  include 
procedures  for  influencing  an  employee’s  work  and 
appraising their performance (Lerner et al. 2009). Similarly, 
Yanadori and Marler (2006) note that compensation practices 
can be connected to strategic objectives by identifying the 
critical employee groups and choosing an appropriate policy 
for internal structure, mix of compensation types and the 
basis for pay increases. 
Agency theory and compensation
Agency theory is structured around the nature of relationships 
within organisations, in terms of communications between 
a principal and an agent, in which the principal delegates 
work  to  the  agent  (Roth  &  O’Donnell  1996).  The  pursuit 
of innovative initiatives often involves an exposure to the 
possibility of outcomes involving loss (Goodale et al. 2010). 
Subsequently, the performance of employees attracted to a 
compensation plan may increase in relation to the incentive 
intensity  of  rewards,  measured  as  the  variable  portion  of 
pay (Ncube et al. 2013; Zenger & Marshall 2000). This means 
that marginal gains in income increase with higher incentive 
intensity of rewards and if increased effort has physical or 
psychological costs, employees will choose levels of effort 
such that the marginal gains from those efforts equal their 
marginal cost (Lerner et al. 2009). Therefore, pay plans that 
are more incentive intensive will drive employees to reach 
higher levels of effort and may also lure and keep talented 
employees in the organisation (Snelgar et al. 2013).
Hypothesis development
Encouraging  employees  to  participate  in  venturing  is  not 
just a matter of financial utility maximisation, but instead 
non-outcome-based  measures  like  pay  risk,  job  risk  and 
expectations  of  success  also  play  a  role  in  determining 
whether employees decide to participate in intrapreneurship 
activities  or  not.  It  is  further  noted  that  the  positive 
relationship between profit sharing bonus (outcome-based) 
and employees’ participation in venturing may be negatively 
moderated by job risk and pay risk, and positively moderated 
by an employee’s expectation of success in the new venture 
(Moore & Bussin 2012; Monsen et al. 2009). In other words, it 
is important for job risk and pay risk to be low when using 
a profit sharing bonus to motivate employees to participate 
in  venturing.  These  types  of  trade-offs  can  be  achieved 
where  job  risk  is  decreased,  for  instance  through  flexible 
working hours, providing opportunities for growth and job 
enrichment (Wood & De Menezes 2011). 
By  drawing  on  these  different  theoretical  perspectives, 
hypotheses  are  formulated  in  which  actual  and  desired 
compensation  practices  are  related  to  increased  levels 
of  intrapreneurial  behaviour,  which  then  builds  on  the 
premise  that  there  is  a  contingency  relationship  between 
compensation practices that support corporate venturing. At 
the same time this relationship is moderated by the degree of 
risk or uncertainty associated with intrapreneurial behaviour 
(Hayton 2005; Monsen, Saxton & Patzelt 2007). 
Hypothesis  1:  There  is  a  positive  relationship  between 
actual compensation practices and elevated intrapreneurial 
behaviour. Original Research
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Hypothesis  2:  There  is  a  positive  relationship  between 
desired compensation practices and elevated intrapreneurial 
behaviour. 
Hypothesis 3: The relationship between actual and desired 
compensation practices and elevated levels of intrapreneurial 
behaviour is moderated by the perceptions of risk control in 
the organisation.
Method
Research approach
This  study  was  based  on  quantitative  research  design, 
adopting  a  cross-sectional  and  empirical  approach  using 
primary data sources. The research was both of a descriptive 
and  explanatory  nature  in  that  the  hypotheses  were 
statistically  tested.  A  research  method  involving  a  web-
based  self-reporting  structured  survey  instrument  was 
administered to a sample of employees at various companies 
in the greater Johannesburg area in South Africa. 
Research design
Data collection and sampling
The  first  step  in  data  collection  was  trying  to  identify 
samples of firms that exhibit intrapreneurship practices to 
various  degrees  (thus  minimising  the  restriction  of  range 
problem  within  the  sample).  This  was  challenging  as:  (1) 
intrapreneurship strategies may not be robust in firms and 
(2) firms with highly entrepreneurial strategies may be few 
in  number,  as  continuously  employing  entrepreneurial 
strategies  may  render  these  firms  vulnerable  to  collapse 
(Ireland, Covin & Kuratko 2009). To counteract such sample 
identification challenges, a sample screen was relied upon 
focusing on firms with high rankings on industry reputational 
surveys regarding firm innovation-related matters over an 
extended period. One such listing is the ‘Top 100 Companies’ 
survey which showcases the prowess of South Africa’s most 
successful organisations (Financial Mail 2010). This listing 
shows how organisations are judged according to how the 
firm uses technology and innovation to achieve objectives 
such as maximising profits, gaining market share, creating 
niche  markets  or  adding  value  for  stakeholders.  Several 
other  databases  and  listings  that  incorporate  innovative 
organisations,  such  as  the  Johannesburg  Chamber  of 
Commerce  and  Industry  (JCCI)  (2011)  and  the  database 
of  the  South  Africa  Business  Guidebook  (2009),  served 
as  sampling  frames.  Consistent  with  previous  studies  of 
a  similar  nature,  the  sample  was  composed  of  various 
corporate  employees  and  managers  (Monsen  et  al.  2007). 
At  least  ten  permanent  individual  employees  from  entry 
level to managerial level per firm were surveyed using non-
probability sampling. Initially 671 corporate employees were 
surveyed with a structured web-based instrument of which 
a final sample of 209 employees was obtained. Additionally, 
by adhering to Stevenson’s (1983) view of entrepreneurship 
as a management approach relevant to many different types 
of firms, a diverse range of businesses was sampled. 
The  following  sample  characteristics  emerged  from  this 
procedure:  over  half  (56%)  of  the  respondents  were  men, 
62% were in the 26–40 year age group, almost all (89%) were 
in the entry level to managerial level group of employees, 
approximately  three-quarters  (78%)  had  spent  five  years 
or fewer in their current organisation, approximately two-
thirds (68%) were in industries other than manufacturing, 
information  technology  and  telecommunications  (some  of 
these other industries included banking, finance, mining and 
retail) and approximately two-thirds (69%) were in firms with 
150 or more employees. Based on the relative heterogeneity 
of the different industry sectors sampled, the generalisability 
of the study is strengthened (Davidsson 2004).
Instruments 
The research survey design was a self-reporting online closed 
questionnaire consisting of three separate sections measuring 
the concepts under study. Care was taken to ensure clarity in 
terminology and to ensure that the items of the questionnaire 
addressed each of the hypotheses. 
Existing instruments were scrutinised for suitability and the 
following scales were used in this study:
•	 Items  previously  used  by  Miller  and  Friesen  (1983)  to 
measure risk-taking or aversion propensity; the original 
overall scale was found to possess an acceptable degree 
of reliability (α = 0.63). 
•	 Items  originally  used  by  Block  and  Ornati  (1987)  to 
measure  actual  and  desired  incentives  for  improved 
venture manager’s performance, based on the satisfactory 
reliability when used in the Intrapreneurship Assessment 
Instrument (CEAI) (α  = 0.73) (Hornsby, Kuratko & Zahra 
2002).
•	 Items  originally  used  by  Pearce,  Kramer  and  Robbins 
(1997)  to  measure  entrepreneurial  behaviour  by 
managers, as based on satisfactory reliability when used 
in the Intrapreneurship Assessment Instrument (CEAI) (α   
= 0.89) (Hornsby et al. 2002).
Following  the  literature  review,  the  study  variables  were 
operationalised  as  follows  in  terms  of  independent, 
dependent or moderator variables:
•	 Actual  compensation  practices  (ACP)  and  desired 
compensation practices (DCP) = independent variables 
(IV). Examples of these questions included items such 
as: (1) variable bonuses based on return on investment 
of new venture formed from the intrapreneur’s idea, (2) 
fixed bonuses for milestone achievement and (3) options 
in parent company equity.
•	 Elevated  intrapreneurial  behaviour  (EIB)  =  dependent 
variable  (DV).  Examples  of  these  questions  included 
items such as: (1) I would get proposed actions through 
bureaucratic red tape and into practice efficiently and (2) 
I would display an enthusiasm for acquiring skills.
•	 Risk  control  (RC)  =  moderator  or  interaction  variable. 
Examples of these questions included items such as: (1) In 
general, my department have a strong proclivity for low-
risk projects, with normal and certain rates of return and Original Research
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(2) In general, my department fosters and encourages a 
lesser level of business, financial and personal risk-taking.
Collectively, 44 items were used in a structured questionnaire 
in which responses were collected using a five-point Likert 
scale:  1  =  ‘strongly  disagree’  with  the  statement,  whilst  5 
=  ‘strongly  agree’.  Common  method  response  bias  was 
controlled for to some degree by safeguarding respondent 
anonymity, as well as ensuring that the questions relating 
to  the  dependent  variables  were  located  away  from  the 
independent and moderator variables in the instrument.
Prior to testing the study hypotheses, the scales were tested 
for reliability and validity. In order to ensure the instrument 
had face and content validity, a preliminary analysis via a 
pilot test was undertaken. This process allowed the researcher 
to  refine  the  questionnaire  design  to  maximise  responses. 
Moreover, this procedure ensured that the respondents had 
no difficulties in answering the questions and there was no 
problem in recording the data. Having established content 
validity, a closer look at the instruments revealed that they 
were not actually dimensions measuring a construct; rather, 
they were instruments with a set of different compensation 
practices.  Consequently,  only  instrument  reliability  was 
tested; a Cronbach’s alpha value above 0.7 was considered 
adequate for internal consistency (Cooper & Schindler 2008). 
The different sections revealed the following values: actual 
compensation practices scale (α = 0.89), desired compensation 
practices scale (α = 0.89), elevated intrapreneurial behaviour 
scale (α = 0.89) and risk control scale (α = 0.79).
Research procedure
The survey was distributed using an online survey system, 
which was selected principally because of its functionality 
and  ease  of  use.  A  personalised  email  accompanied  each 
questionnaire,  explaining  the  aim  and  objectives  of  the 
research and assuring the respondent of the confidentiality 
of  their  responses.  A  follow-up  request  was  sent  out 
approximately two weeks after the initial survey.
Data collection was conducted over a four-week period; 266 
responses were received of which 57 were discarded because 
of  incompleteness.  This  resulted  in  a  final  sample  of  209 
employees and a response rate of 31.15%. To test for non-
response bias (Armstrong & Overton 1977), firm size, age 
and sales growth of responding firms were compared with 
non-responding firms, using secondary data obtained from 
a similar Technology Top 100 survey (Financial Mail 2010). 
Results of t-tests comparing the mean scores of the responding 
and non-responding firms revealed no differences (p > 0.10), 
suggesting that the sample appears to be representative of 
the population from which it was drawn.
Ethical issues were taken into consideration by ensuring that 
the instrument used posed no risk or danger to respondents. 
The study purpose and benefits to the sample population 
as well as the participant’s rights and protection was made 
explicit and explained to the respondents at the start of the 
data collection process. Moreover, full and open information 
(informed consent) was made available to respondents, to 
ensure that no form of deception and misrepresentation was 
used to extract information from the respondents and their 
privacy and confidentiality was respected at all times.
Statistical analysis
During  data  analysis,  descriptive  and  inferential  statistics 
were  calculated  using  the  STATISTICA  software  system, 
version 10 (StatSoft 2011). To check for differences between 
actual  and  desired  compensation  practices,  t-tests  for 
dependent or related groups were performed. 
Canonical correlational analysis was carried out to test the 
hypotheses. This method is often used when researchers need 
to relate one set of variables to other sets of variables or when 
it is necessary to represent a large data set by several, easy-
to-interpret variables (Lerner et al. 2009). With this method, 
the effects of key variables in one data set on all or several of 
the variables in the other sets can be easily identified. Several 
types of multivariate analyses exist and in the case of two 
or more data sets, canonical correlation analysis has been 
successfully used in previous research (Tishler et al. 1996). 
Canonical  correlation  analysis  allows  multiple  measures 
to  be  summarised  into  variants  or  linear  combinations  of 
variables  with  weighting  optimised,  extracting  maximum 
variance from the original measures (Hair et al. 2010).
Results
Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics were calculated for each of the sections 
of  the  instrument  in  terms  of  values  of  central  tendency, 
variability  and  skewness.  The  summary  statistics  across 
items indicate that the values of the means and medians of 
all the scales are skewed towards the high end of the Likert 
scale, indicating agreement with the item. Thus the responses 
to  these  scales  are  generally  positive  or  very  positive,  an 
observation  consistent  with  the  skewness  of  the  scales. 
This suggests that employees perceive they will act in an 
intrapreneurial manner despite their concerns about danger 
and  approval  issues,  in  terms  of  risk  control,  which  also 
reveals high mean scores across items. 
To make further sense of the descriptive statistics, a t-test 
for  dependent  or  related  groups  was  performed  to  check 
for  differences  between  actual  and  desired  compensation 
practices. Table 1 reveals that there is a significant difference 
in  all  types  of  compensation  practices  when  comparing 
mean scores of actual and desired compensation items. This 
suggests that these employees believe that there is a large 
gap  between  actual  and  desired  compensation  practices. 
For instance, the item ‘incidence of options in new venture 
equity’ was low in terms of actual practice (mean = 1.81), in 
contrast with its perceived desirability (mean = 4.00).
Hypothesis testing 
To test Hypothesis 1, in terms of the expected relationship 
between  ACP  and  EIB,  canonical  correlational  analysis Original Research
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was  carried  out.  The  overall  canonical  R-value  (0.58)  was 
relatively substantial (StatSoft 2011) and highly significant 
(p < 0.000). This value was the simple correlation between 
the weighted sum scores in each set of variables, with the 
weights pertaining to the first (and most significant) canonical 
root. It is important to note that the maximum number of 
canonical  roots  that  could  be  extracted  was  equal  to  the 
smallest number of variables in either set; thus, 17 canonical 
roots were extracted (Statsoft 2011). All 17 canonical roots 
extracted  100%  of  the  variance  from  the  left  set  (17  ACP 
items) and 97.00% of the variance in the right set (EIB items). 
The total redundancy for the ACP items was 11.75%, whilst 
that of the EIB items was 9.98%. Based on this result, only the 
first canonical root was considered significant and thus used 
in further analysis. For root factor 1, the variance extracted 
for ACP was 0.042, with a redundancy of 0.014; for EIB the 
variance  extracted  was  0.026  with  a  redundancy  of  0.008. 
The  second  root  was  statistically  non-significant  and  was 
excluded from further analysis. The results of the canonical 
correlational analysis are displayed in Table 2.
Additionally,  canonical  analysis  included  calculating  the 
factor structures, which are referred to as canonical loadings 
or  structure  coefficients.  For  ACP  nine  items  had  low 
loadings on the first canonical factor, ranging from 0.02 to 
0.26, whilst eight items had negative loadings, which means 
they had a very low correlation with this factor. The other 
seven ACP items revealed low loadings on the first canonical 
factor, ranging from 0.04 to 0.18, whilst 11 items had negative 
loadings, indicating a very low correlation with that factor. 
The first canonical root extracted an average of 4.00% of the 
variance from the ACP items and an average of 3.00% of the 
variance from the EIB items. Based on the set of EIB items, the 
first canonical root accounted for about 1.00% of the variance 
in the ACP items (redundancy). Based on the set of ACP 
items, the first canonical root accounted for about 0.90% of 
the variance in the EIB items. This set of results suggests that 
the set of ACP items were not predicting the set of EIB items; 
thus,  Hypothesis  1  cannot  be  supported  by  the  empirical 
evidence. 
To examine Hypothesis 2 in terms of the relationship between 
DCP  and  EIB,  the  same  procedure  in  terms  of  canonical 
analysis was carried out. The results are shown in Table 3. 
The overall canonical R (0.70) was quite substantial (StatSoft 
2011) and highly significant (p < 0.001). All of the 17 extracted 
canonical roots extracted 100% of the variance from the left 
set (17 DCP items) and 97.00% of the variance in the right 
set (EIB items). The total redundancy for the DCP items was 
21.08%, whilst that of the EIB items was 25.07%. This means 
that, based on all canonical roots and given the EIB items, 
21.08% of the variance in the DCP was accounted for, whilst 
given the DCP items, 25.07% of the variance in the EIB was 
accounted  for.  These  results  reveal  a  poor  but  significant 
latent root and suggest a weak overall relationship between 
items in the two sets of variables. 
In terms of factor structures, only the first canonical root was 
significant, and further examined. The items for EIB ranged 
from 0.10 to 0.79. The 12 items with the highest loadings ranged 
from 0.51 to 0.79. Of these 12 items, 11 were items measuring 
innovation  and  proactivity  whilst  one  item  measured  risk. 
Therefore, innovation and proactivity are highly representative 
of EIB. The items for DCP had loadings ranging from 0.15 to 
0.71. The seven items with the highest loadings were praise 
and  recognition,  motivation-based  compensation,  flexible 
work  hours,  job  enrichment,  variable  bonuses  for  milestone 
achievement,  accelerated  promotion  and  opportunity  for 
growth. These seven items correlated highly with the one factor. 
Of these seven items, six were all non-monetary compensation 
practices, suggesting that non-monetary compensation practices 
are the best predictors of the 11 items measuring innovation and 
proactivity, in terms of EIB. The first canonical root extracted 
an average of 20% of the variance from the DCP items and an 
average of 32% of the variance from the EIB items. These results 
translate into a significant canonical correlation (0.70) between 
the items in terms of DCP and EIB (based on the first canonical 
root). The set of items in the DCP variable that best predicted 
the 11 EIB items on innovation and proactivity were the non-
monetary compensation practices. Thus, Hypothesis 2 cannot 
be fully supported due to a lack of empirical evidence.
TABLE 1: Mean score differences between actual versus desired compensation practices.
Type of compensation practices Actual compensation practices Desired compensation practices
Mean SD t p Mean SD t p
Variable bonuses based on return on investment of new 
venture formed from the intrapreneur’s idea
2.33 1.27 -15.65 0.000 4.08 0.91 -15.65 0.000
Fixed bonuses for milestone achievement 2.97 1.33 -9.86 0.000 4.02 1.01 -9.86 0.000
Options in parent company equity 2.10 1.30 -15.03 0.000 3.82 1.07 -15.03 0.000
Equity in parent company 2.03 1.18 -15.79 0.000 3.80 1.09 -15.79 0.000
Higher than normal salary 2.60 1.18 -14.77 0.000 4.14 0.99 -14.77 0.000
Equity in new venture formed from the intrapreneur’s idea 1.81 1.05 -21.76 0.000 4.00 1.04 -21.76 0.000
Options in new venture equity 1.81 1.01 -22.45 0.000 4.00 0.94 -22.45 0.000
Variable bonuses for milestone achievement 2.66 1.27 -15.09 0.000 4.20 0.89 -15.09 0.000
Accelerated promotion 2.68 1.08 -15.43 0.000 4.19 0.93 -15.43 0.000
Motivation-based compensation 2.84 1.19 -12.22 0.000 4.13 0.98 -12.22 0.000
Job security 3.39 1.13 -6.16 0.000 3.99 1.09 -6.16 0.000
Flexible work hours 3.29 1.34 -7.63 0.000 4.16 1.02 -7.63 0.000
Opportunity for growth 3.54 1.05 -11.07 0.000 4.52 0.78 -11.07 0.000
Job enrichment 3.40 1.07 -10.67 0.000 4.41 0.81 -10.67 0.000
Praise and recognition 3.50 1.04 -9.56 0.000 4.39 0.95 -9.56 0.000
Dinner at a prestigious restaurant 2.51 1.20 -6.85 0.000 3.23 1.27 -6.85 0.000
Weekend at a hotel in South Africa or abroad 1.94 1.20 -14.15 0.000 3.36 1.30 -14.15 0.000
SD, standard deviation.Original Research
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In  terms  of  Hypothesis  3,  to  examine  the  potential 
moderating  effect  of  risk  control  on  the  DCP-EIB 
relationship, a multiple regression procedure was executed 
incorporating  the  interaction  term  of  ‘Risk  x  DCP’.  The 
first  canonical  roots  of  DCP  served  as  the  independent 
variable whilst the first canonical root of EIB served as the 
dependent variable. An interaction term was created for each 
respondent by multiplying the averages of the responses on 
the risk control scale with the corresponding first canonical 
roots of the DCP items. The following values were obtained 
based on this procedure: R = 0.71, R² = 0.50, adjusted R = 0.49 
(p < 0.000), standard error of estimate = 0.71 and F (2196) 
=  99.36.  Additionally,  the  summary  results  are  shown  in 
Table 4. These values indicate that 50.34% of the variation 
in the dependent variable (EIB) is attributable to variation 
across the desired compensation practices items. However, 
the  moderation  effect  of  risk  control  was  not  statistically 
significant  when  risk  control  was  used  as  a  moderator. 
The p-value for the regression model was not statistically 
significant at t (196) = -1.7093 (p > 0.050), and suggest that it 
can be removed from the model. This means that risk control 
did  moderate  the  DCP-EIB  relationship.  Consequently, 
Hypothesis 3 cannot be supported in terms of the empirical 
evidence.
Discussion 
Based  on  the  statistical  analysis,  the  results  reveal  that 
gaps  exist  between  employees’  perception  of  the  desired 
compensation  practices  and  the  actual  compensation 
practices.  In  addition,  the  sample  of  respondents  in  this 
study  seem  to  prefer  mostly  non-monetary  compensation 
practices, such as job enrichment, opportunity for growth, 
TABLE 2: Hypothesis 1: Canonical analysis on actual compensation practices and elevated intrapreneurial behaviour.
Actual compensation practice Root 1 Elevated intrapreneurial behaviour Root 1
Job security -0.02 Get proposed actions through red tape -0.02
Higher than normal salary -0.04 Take initiative for my own ideas -0.03
Equity in parent company -0.10 Show support for the good ideas of others -0.04
Weekend at a hotel in South Africa or abroad -0.11 First act and then ask for approval, even when I know that will annoy other people -0.07
Equity in new venture formed from the 
intrapreneur’s idea
-0.12 Get people to rally together to meet a challenge -0.07 
Options in parent company equity -0.17 Search for a solution immediately when something goes wrong -0.08
Options in new venture equity -0.20 Often take risks in my job -0.17
Flexible work hours  -0.44 Quickly change course of action when results are not being achieved -0.18
Accelerated promotion 0.02 Actively attack pressing organisational problems -0.19
Job enrichment 0.09 Unconcerned with danger -0.31
Fixed bonuses for milestone achievement 0.11 Boldly move ahead with a promising new approach when others might be more cautious -0.38
Praise and recognition 0.11 Regularly go for the big win even when things could seriously go wrong 0.04
Dinner at a prestigious restaurant 0.21 Willingly expose myself to situations with uncertain outcomes 0.07
Motivation-based compensation  0.23 Think about my work in new and stimulating ways 0.11
Opportunity for growth 0.23 Find ways to improve our products and services 0.13
Variable bonuses for milestone achievement 0.24 Use opportunities quickly in order to attain my goals 0.14
Variable bonuses based on return on investment of 
new venture formed from the intrapreneur’s idea
0.26
  
Display an enthusiasm for acquiring skills 0.17
Devote a great deal of effort to selling my ideas 0.18
TABLE 3: Hypothesis 2: Desired compensation practices and elevated intrapreneurial behaviour.
Desired compensation practice Factor 
structure of 
root 1
Elevated intrapreneurial behaviour Factor structure 
of root 1
Higher than normal salary 0.15 First act and then ask for approval, even when I know that will annoy other people 0.1
Equity in parent company 0.18 Unconcerned with danger 0.16
Fixed bonuses for milestone achievement 0.19 Willingly expose myself to situations with uncertain outcomes 0.19
Weekend at a hotel in South Africa or abroad 0.22 Get proposed actions through bureaucratic red tape 0.28
Dinner at a prestigious restaurant  0.26 Regularly go for the big win even when things could seriously go wrong 0.33
Variable bonuses based on ROI of new venture 
formed from the intrapreneur’s idea
0.34 Find ways to improve our products and services 0.46
Options in new venture equity 0.36 Often take risks in my job 0.51
Job security 0.38 Boldly move ahead with a promising new approach when others might be more cautious 0.53
Options in parent company equity 0.46 Display an enthusiasm for acquiring skills 0.54
Equity in new venture formed from the 
intrapreneur’s idea
0.49 Actively attack pressing organisational problems 0.59
Praise and recognition 0.51 Devote a great deal of effort to selling my ideas 0.61
Motivation-based compensation 0.52 Quickly change course of action when results are not being achieved 0.63
Flexible work hours 0.53 Think about my work in new and stimulating ways 0.69
Job enrichment 0.53 Show support for the good ideas of others 0.73
Variable bonuses for milestone achievement 0.61 Search for a solution immediately when something goes wrong 0.76
Accelerated promotion 0.64 Use opportunities quickly in order to attain my goals 0.77
Opportunity for growth 0.71 Take initiative for my own ideas 0.78
Get people to rally together to meet a challenge 0.79Original Research
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flexible  work  hours,  motivation-based  compensation  and 
accelerated promotion. Moreover, the main outcome-based 
compensation practice preferred by respondents was variable 
bonuses in terms of ‘milestone achievement’.
The  findings  emanating  from  this  study  resonate  with 
similar  research  which  showed  that  intrapreneurs  prefer 
compensation practices that relate to the performance of the 
organisation  as  well  as  their  individual  performance  (i.e. 
outcome-based compensation practices). This is an important 
finding  considering  that  outcome-based  compensation 
practices are necessary to promote the bearing of uncertainty 
and reduction of opportunism (Lerner et al. 2009). Consistent 
with agency theory, outcome-based compensation practices 
align  the  preferences  of  agents  and  principals  because 
the rewards for both parties depend on the same actions. 
Moreover, the results of this study signify that employees 
prefer non-monetary compensation practices as well, which 
could be due to the organisations that were surveyed not 
having the means, ability or desire to compensate employees 
in a direct outcome-based compensation manner. It is also 
plausible  that  most  organisations  reserve  outcome-based 
compensation practices for directors and executives who, for 
personal gains, might not be willing to share such benefits 
with lower level employees.
The results highlight that non-outcome-based measures like 
pay risk, job risk and expectations of success play a role in 
determining whether employees decide to be innovative or 
not. This finding resonates with Monsen et al.’s (2009) research 
which found that employees are reported to participate in 
intrapreneurial  behaviour  as  a  result  of  job  risk  and  pay 
risk,  and  that  employee’s  expectations  are  an  important 
moderator. In other words, it is important for job risk and pay 
risk to be low when using profit sharing bonused to motivate 
employees to participate in intrapreneurial behaviour. 
The  results  confirm  that  opportunity  for  growth  and  job 
enrichment are strong predictors of elevated intrapreneurial 
behaviour. This finding is reflected in past studies that show 
that  opportunity  for  growth  and  job  enrichment  are  best 
fostered through on-the-job training to elevate intrapreneurial 
behaviour. Higher levels of internal knowledge sharing relate 
to stronger intrapreneurial behaviour, and such knowledge 
sharing in turn results from higher levels of trust and goal 
congruence  (De  Clercq,  Dimov  &  Thongpapanl  2013).  At 
the same time however, risk control has a strong positive 
moderating effect on the relationship between organisational 
boundaries  and  innovation  performance,  and  a  strong 
negative moderating effect on the relationship between time 
availability  and  innovation  performance.  The  implication 
of  this  moderating  effect  is  that  desired  compensation 
practices are perhaps only one of the many organisational 
antecedents  that  can  elevate  intrapreneurial  behaviour. 
Other  organisational  antecedents  like  organisational 
support, organisational boundaries and time availability are 
equally important to consider in stimulating intrapreneurial 
behaviour. 
In summary, even though the empirical evidence emanating 
from  this  study  did  not  support  the  hypotheses,  the 
results  are  nonetheless  revealing.  Principally  the  findings 
indicate  that  implementing  an  intrapreneurship  strategy 
in an organisation is quite challenging due to the failure to 
appreciate how risk control and other control variables work 
in conjunction with compensation and other organisational 
antecedents to facilitate elevated intrapreneurial behaviour. 
Compensation  practices  need  to  be  connected  to  strategic 
objectives by formulating an appropriate mix of compensation 
types, whilst at the same time mitigating the degree of risk or 
uncertainty associated with intrapreneurial behaviour.
Implications 
Essentially  the  results  have  contextual  relevance:  little 
is  known  about  intrapreneurial  behaviour  or  indeed 
intrapreneurship in emerging economies (Bruton, Ahlstrom 
& Obloj 2008). Emerging economies are characterised by rapid 
change and have an institutional and market environment 
quite different to those in Western economies (Antoncic & 
Hisrich  2001).  Currently  there  is  little  knowledge  on  this 
topic emerging from an efficiency-driven economy like South 
Africa, which shows differences in innovative behaviour, risk 
profile,  compensation  practices  and  culture  (Bosma,  Stam 
& Wennekers 2010; Urban 2008). In the present day South 
African  socio-economic  milieu,  compensation  practices 
seem  to  be  insufficient  to  motivate  employees  to  behave 
intrapreneurially,  especially  if  the  degree  of  uncertainty 
in the corporate environment is taken into account. Many 
firms in emerging economies will need to focus on increased 
innovation in order to compete globally (Urban & Barreria 
2010). 
Relevant to emerging economies is that recent research finds 
that  intrapreneurship  and  independent  entrepreneurship 
seem  to  be  substitutes  at  the  macro  level.  Large  firms  in 
high-income countries tend to display more entrepreneurial 
behaviour  than  large  firms  in  low-income  countries  do 
(Bosma et al. 2010). Indeed a tentative positive correlation 
between intrapreneurship and GDP per capita is possible. 
Thus, it appears that entrepreneurial activities by employees 
are,  as  predicted  by  theory,  more  prevalent  as  a  country 
moves  towards  the  more  advanced  phases  of  economic 
development. There is a need for further theorisation and 
TABLE 4: Regression summary for dependent variable (elevated intrapreneurial behaviour 1st canonical root).
N = 199 b* Standard error of  b** b* Standard error of  b** t (196) p-value
Intercept 0.01687 0.05129 0.32888 0.74260
DCP (1st canonical root) 1.12504 0.25124 1.12504 0.25124 4.47792 0.00001
Interaction term (risk x DCP) -0.42945 0.25124 –0.12631 0.07389 –1.70932 0.08896
*, unstandardized coefficients; **, standardized coefficients.Original Research
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empirical analysis of how different contexts may influence 
intrapreneurial behaviour. 
Considering that there has been a call for a considerable shift 
toward a more effective applied research agenda (Kenworthy 
&  McMullan  2013),  a  multifaceted  understanding  of 
compensation  practices  in  the  intrapreneurship  context 
is  important  not  only  for  academic  purposes  but  also 
because the subject has salience for practitioners and policy-
makers.  These  implications  relate  to  the  profitability  and 
competitiveness of the firm as well as to the overall economic 
performance of industry and the national economy. Businesses 
that  incorporate  innovation  into  their  vision  by  relying 
on  entrepreneurial  strategies  and  actions  understand  that 
innovation is at the core of an entrepreneurial organisation. 
It is around this core that other elements of the organisation, 
such as strategy, management style and structure, are built. 
The study also provides guidance to innovation specialists 
and  company  leaders  interested  in  incentivising  their 
employees  to  undertake  intrapreneurial  practices. 
Compensation  practices  can  either  be  used  as  a  tool  to 
increase innovative activity or it can discourage innovative 
activity  by  rewarding  non-salient  behaviours.  Due  to  the 
potential impact rewards have on intrapreneurial behaviour, 
it  is  necessary  to  design  relevant  compensation  systems 
as  part  of  organisational  architecture  in  order  to  foster 
intrapreneurship. Additionally, the results provide direction 
to  employees  seeking  to  engage  in  intrapreneurship  and 
provide them with a fair indication of what compensation 
practices they could expect, whilst considering commensurate 
risks. Considering that intrapreneurship is contingent upon 
individual  members  undertaking  innovative  activities 
(Hornsby  et  al.  2009),  management  must  design  incentive 
contracts  that  consider  both  the  desired  compensation 
practices  and  actual  deterrents  prohibiting  intrapreneurial 
behaviour. 
Limitations of study and future research
The present study strictly focused on compensation practices 
and risk factors but did not take into account different types of 
rewards, such as team rewards or organisation-level rewards 
and their potential influence on intrapreneurial behaviour. 
Based on the exploratory nature of this study, future studies 
need  to  be  replicated  with  more  fine-grained  analysis  of 
compensation practices. Moreover, due to the cross-sectional 
nature  of  the  study,  any  causal  relationship  between 
compensation  practices  and  intrapreneurial  behaviour  is 
not plausible. A longitudinal study is required to provide 
further insights into and causal inferences in the relationship 
between compensation practices and intrapreneurial levels. 
The representativeness of the sample is questionable, since 
no database of intrapreneurial firms exists in South Africa; 
furthermore,  the  selection  criteria  used  for  the  present 
study merely serves as a starting point for sample selection. 
Additionally, in terms of its instrument design, the study 
relied on perceptual data which means data may have been 
contaminated by perceptual biases and cognitive limitations 
of respondents. Lastly, as a result of using canonical analysis, 
when the number of variables in one of the data sets is high 
(as was the case in this study) the weightings obtained by 
canonical analysis may be unreliable (Tishler et al. 1996). 
Much corporate entrepreneurship (CE) research focuses on 
large corporations yet small and medium enterprises may 
also involve scope for significant CE; future research could 
link compensation practices of these firms to intrapreneurial 
behaviour. Additionally, future research could try to unpack 
not only the nature of rewards but also how compensation 
systems  need  to  be  configured  according  to  the  industry 
life-cycle stage. Similarly, by focusing on specific contexts, 
differences  in  compensation  practices  may  be  revealed 
according  to  different  sector  types.  For  instance  the  high 
technology  sector  may  require  unique  compensation 
practices,  which  could  be  identified  as  distinct  for  that 
particular  sector.  There  is  a  need  for  further  theorisation 
and  empirical  analysis  of  different  types  of  organisations 
and sectors, as well as understanding how different contexts 
influence intrapreneurial behaviour through compensation 
practices. Similar organisations with similar compensation 
practices  can  have  different  effects  in  different  contexts. 
Consequently, a need exists for a more subtle way to analyse 
how contextual variables differ in emerging economies and 
to what degree they shape intrapreneurial behaviours.
Conclusion 
The  study  contributes  to  existing  literature  and  extends 
current  knowledge  by  investigating  the  relationship 
between  desired  and  actual  compensation  practices  and 
intrapreneurial behaviour, whilst also examining the degree 
of uncertainty and risk as moderators of this relationship. By 
focusing on how to elevate intrapreneurial behaviour, rather 
than  merely  researching  whether  corporate  innovation  is 
desirable  or  not,  the  study  results  have  direct  application 
to policy-makers and managers. By empirically researching 
actual  and  desired  compensation  practices,  as  well  as 
deterrents prohibiting intrapreneurial behaviour, managers 
are able to better understand the contingency relationship 
between compensation practices and intrapreneurship.
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